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What we have proposed is that when a listener tries to understand what a speaker 
means, the process he goes through can limit memory access to information that is 
common ground between the speaker and his addressees. [...] ...the comprehension 
process must keep track of common ground, and its performance will be optimal if 
it limits its access to that common ground. Whether its design is actually optimal in 
this respect is a question that can only be answered empirically. (Clark & Carlson, 
1981, p. 76-77) 
With this restricted access hypothesis, Clark and Carlson (1981) set the theoretical stage 
for what is now an active area of research on perspective taking in spoken language 
comprehension. Along with similar notions such as mutual knowledge and common knowledge 
(e.g., Lewis, 1969), common ground—information that interlocutors share and believe they 
share (Clark & Marshall, 1981)—has played an critical role in theories of pragmatics. Such 
constructs  appear  most  prominently  in  Clark’s  collaborative  model,  but  are  characteristic  in 
general of pragmatic approaches that invoke assumptions of cooperativity, assumptions that can 
be traced back to Grice (1957). 
Before the visual world paradigm became the dominant methodology for studying 
conversational perspective taking, there were a number of investigations using traditional 
psycholinguistic methodologies (for review, see Barr & Keysar, 2006). A number of these studies 
found evidence for the use of common ground during language interpretation (Clark, Schreuder, 
& Buttrick, 1983; Gerrig & Littman, 1990; Greene, Gerrig, McKoon, & Ratcliff, 1994; Gibbs, 
Mueller, & Cox, 1988), but their methodologies offered only limited insight. First, some of them 
used third-party judgments of the interpretation of written text (Gerrig & Littman, 1990; Gibbs 
et al., 1988), which are unlikely to be representative of what takes place when addressees 
comprehend spoken language in conversational contexts. Second, some of them failed to 
distinguish the use of information because it was jointly available from its use because of its 
availability to the self, possibly leading to the underestimation of egocentric language processing 
(see Keysar, 1997 for discussion). But the critical limitation of these studies is that they offered 
almost no insight into the time-course with which listeners integrate information about a 
speaker’s perspective with the incoming speech. 
Visual-world eyetracking greatly expanded the potential for insight into how listeners 
access and use common ground during situated language comprehension (for background on  
visual-world eyetracking, see Spivey and Huette, this volume; Pykkönnen and Crocker, this 
volume). Indeed, it is arguably in the study of situated language understanding that the key 
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advantages of the visual world paradigm are most fully realized. First, visual world tasks 
fundamentally involve reference, with listeners following instructions to manipulate objects or 
pictures in a display. Referential ambiguity has long been a primary focus of pragmatic theories 
(Clark & Carlson, 1981; Clark & Marshall, 1981), and is one of the most common sources of 
misunderstanding in conversation (Schegloff, 1987). Also, the use of spoken language to search 
for referents within an environment can be quite naturally made part of a joint task, such as 
working together to rearrange objects in a grid (Hanna, Tanenhaus, & Trueswell, 2003; Nadig & 
Sedivy, 2002; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000). Next, visual world eyetracking makes it 
possible to observe the referential process as it unfolds in time, without the observation process 
itself influencing comprehension, since it requires no deliberative judgments beyond those 
involved  in  the  interpretation  process  itself.  Finally,  the  listener’s  gaze  location  is  sampled  at 
such a high rate (60–2000 Hz) as to provide a nearly continuous profile of the entire 
interpretation process, from anticipatory processing to high-level decision processes. However, 
with this new observational power comes substantive interpretive and statistical challenges that 
are often underappreciated. 
The study of conversational perspective taking in spoken language comprehension has 
become a productive area of visual world research, with close to 30 published visual world 
studies to date in just over a decade of research. From the earliest few studies with typically-
developing adults, the area has expanded to investigate perspective taking in a broad range of 
contexts, including: 
• development (Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004; Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; Sobel, Sedivy, 
Buchanan, & Hennessy, 2011); 
• scalar implicature (Grodner & Sedivy, 2011; Heller, Grodner, & Tanenhaus, 2008); 
• the role of executive control (Brown-Schmidt, 2009b; Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010); 
• effects of bilingualism (Rubio-Fernández & Glucksberg, 2011); 
• effects of mood (Converse, Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2008); 
• effects of familiarity between interlocutors (Savitsky, Keysar, Epley, Carter, & Swanson, 
2011); 
• joint action (Hanna & Tanenhaus, 2004); 
• cross-cultural differences (Wu & Keysar, 2007); 
• autism (Begeer, Malle, Nieuwland, & Keysar, 2010); 
• disfluency (Arnold, Hudson Kam, & Tanenhaus, 2007); 
• repeated  reference  and  “conceptual  pacts”  (Barr  &  Keysar,  2002;  Brennan  &  Hanna, 
2009; Brown-Schmidt, 2009a; Horton & Slaten, 2011; Kronmüller & Barr, 2007; Metzing 
& Brennan, 2003) 
My goal in the current chapter is not to review these studies; many of them have already 
been reviewed elsewhere (Barr & Keysar, 2006; Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Brown-Schmidt & 
Hanna, 2011). Instead, my aim is to address some long-standing controversies in this research 
area that, in my view, have impeded progress on important theoretical issues, and on which 
there is a pressing need to arrive at some kind of consensus. Recently, several researchers 
(Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Brown-Schmidt & Hanna, 2011; see also Brown-Schmidt, this volume) 
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have taken note of the apparent divergence of findings in the area, with some studies appearing 
to show stronger and earlier effects of common ground than others. They explain these 
divergent findings in terms of the different paradigms various researchers have used to study 
conversation and the extent to which these paradigms provide interlocutors with opportunities 
to interactively establish common ground. They further suggest that studies showing the earliest 
and strongest effects of common ground are those that allow common ground to be established 
through live interaction. In contrast, they suggest that studies lacking live interaction—studies 
which often use pre-recorded materials with elaborate cover stories to convince listeners they 
are listening to live speech—tend to show weaker effects of common ground. 
In this chapter, I will argue against such attempt to reconcile findings based on 
assumptions about interactivity. My argument has two main strands. First, although it seems 
plausible that interaction gives stronger evidence for common ground, thus potentially yielding 
stronger effects, the studies targeted as insufficiently interactive do indeed show reliable effects 
of common ground; however, they do not show such effects on all levels of processing. So any 
explanation that invokes interactivity would have to say why it is the case that this information 
was used at some but not at all levels. Second—and more importantly—the explanation accepts 
the divergence in published findings at face value. However, a closer look at several key studies 
shows that the divergences are more likely to reflect inconsistent practices of analysis and 
interpretation applied to underlying body of data that is, in fact, surprisingly consistent. Had all 
datasets been analyzed in the same way, researchers would have largely come to the same 
conclusions. Until disagreements about the relationship between theory and data are resolved, 
it is premature to debate wider issues about the pros and cons of different research paradigms 
for investigating common ground. If researchers not in agreement about what effects are 
present in their data, and what such effects mean, attempts to debate any broader issues will be 
largely futile. 
To a large extent, how we analyze data is informed by our theoretical outlook—we look 
for those things we expect to find, in the manner we expect to find them. To date, research on 
perspective taking has focused on explanations pitched at the level of individual language users, 
asking if speakers or listeners use common ground in their processing of language. To 
demonstrate such person-level effects, it is sufficient to show that common ground had an 
effect on behavior (or brain activity). However, I will argue that the appropriate level of 
explanation is not the level of the individual person, but the individual process. Thus, rather than 
asking questions like, Are listeners sensitive to context in understanding references? we should 
be asking questions like, Does context influence lexical, semantic, syntactic, and/or phonological 
processing; and if so, how? 
This focus on process-level explanations also calls for a different approach in how we 
analyze and interpret data from visual-world eyetracking studies. To adequately support claims 
about effects of context on particular processes requires experimentally isolating those 
processes in the data. I will present evidence that many of the diverging findings in the field are 
the result of different approaches to the handling of anticipatory baseline effects (ABEs) in the 
analysis of visual world data. ABEs arise in perspective-taking studies using visual occlusion 
because listeners have access to constraining information about what speakers do and do not 
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know well before they hear referential expressions. Listeners can make use of this constraining 
information to reduce the set of referential alternatives before hearing speech. To be sure, this 
undeniably shows that listeners are sensitive to common ground from the earliest moments of 
processing. However, it is an independent question whether this information is also available to 
individual processes within the comprehension system—it is entirely possible for individual 
processes within a cognitive architecture to be unaffected by information actively represented 
at other levels within the system (Fodor, 1983; Sloman, 1996). Thus, access does not imply 
integration, since it  is possible that the information about the speaker’s knowledge is not used 
later to modulate the processing of incoming speech. 
It is possible to distinguish between access and integration using appropriate statistical or 
experimental controls. Fortunately, most studies in the area include the relevant experimental 
controls, although such controls are sometimes not treated appropriately in the analysis. By 
looking at the data in a way that includes such controls, I will show that several key studies show 
similar temporal profiles of common ground use during the interpretive process: early 
anticipatory effects, followed by bottom-up effects of lexical processing that are not modulated 
by common ground, followed (optionally) by late effects of common ground that may be post-
lexical in nature. Furthermore, this temporal profile for common ground radically differs from 
the profile of contextual effects induced by verb semantics. Together, these findings are 
consistent with the proposal that lexical processes are encapsulated from common ground (and 
possibly from other situational sources of constraint), but cannot be straightforwardly 
accounted for by probabilistic constraint-based approaches. 
Visual world studies have quickly become a primary source of data not only in the study of 
reference resolution and perspective taking, but also in many other areas of spoken language 
processing. The controversies that have emerged within this particular area of language 
processing are symptomatic of the more general absence of clear standards for relating visual 
world data to psycholinguistic theory. Thus, the lessons that can be drawn by considering this 
area of research in depth are relevant to visual world researchers at large. 
The key tests of perspective-taking in spoken language comprehension have come in the 
form of visual world studies using joint referential communication tasks, in which potential 
referents are made to be either privileged (known only to the listener) or shared (known both to 
the  listener  and  speaker)  by  visual  occlusion  or  by  manipulating  listeners’  beliefs  about  the 
speaker. In this review, I will focus on studies using typically-developing adult populations, and 
that involve the interpretation of simple referential descriptions. After a brief review of the area, 
I will attempt to reconcile the findings by scrutinizing data from three studies that have similar 
experimental designs but that differ in social interactivity: Barr (2008b), Hanna et al. (2003), and 
Brown-Schmidt (2009b). Studies involving repeated reference and “conceptual pacts” (Brennan 
& Clark, 1996) are not considered here, as they involve additional theoretical and interpretive 
issues relating to priming and memory (see Kronmüller and Barr, 2015, for a meta-analysis and 
review). 
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Theoretical and Empirical Background 
In recent discussions of perspective taking in spoken language comprehension, the 
restricted access hypothesis of Clark and Carlson (1981) is not seen as a serious contender. I 
believe this reflects the progress in the area, rather than any intrinsic implausibility of the 
hypothesis in itself. As we have seen from the quote with which we began this chapter, Clark 
and Carlson made principled theoretical claims that a language processor that limited itself to 
information in common ground would be maximally efficient. To be sure, the scope of 
processing that would be restricted in such a way was left vague; it is unclear whether it is 
intended to apply all the way down to low-level phonological and lexical processing. But it is 
beyond dispute that at the very least, Clark and colleagues intended the analysis to apply to 
high-level interpretive processes, such as those involved in interpreting reference: 
“Demonstrative reference is perhaps the prototype of expressions that cannot be understood 
without appeal to context. But what context? If our proposal is correct, all the information the 
listener should ever appeal to  is the speaker’s and addressee’s common ground.” (Clark et al., 
1983, p. 99). Importantly, it is with respect to these referential processes that the restricted 
access model has been repeatedly disconfirmed. 
An early study by Keysar et al. (2000) used a task in which listeners sat facing a 
(confederate) speaker and followed his spoken instructions to rearrange objects in a grid that 
stood vertically between them. Some of the slots of the grid were open from both sides so that 
their contents could be mutually viewed (making the contents shared), while others were closed 
off  from  the  speaker’s  side  so  that  the  listener,  but  not  the  speaker,  could  see  the  contents 
(making the contents privileged). Some of the spoken instructions mentioned a shared “target” 
object  in a way that also matched a privileged “competitor” object. For example, for one  item 
the listener saw three candles of increasing size, the larger two of which were shared, and the 
smallest of which was privileged. According to restricted search, when listeners were told to 
“put the small candle next to the toothpaste,” they should only consider the smaller of the two 
candles visible to the speaker, and not the privileged candle, because the speaker was ignorant 
of the  latter candle’s existence. Disconfirming this prediction,  listeners attended far more to a 
privileged small candle than to a privileged toy monkey, and showed severe delays in identifying 
and selecting the target. In fact, listeners erroneously selected the privileged object instead of 
the target about 20% of the time, a rate that is surprisingly high, at least from the standpoint of 
restricted search. Other studies using a computerized version of the task in which listeners do 
not receive feedback observe an even higher rate of errors, around 40–50% of trials containing a 
competitor (Apperly et al., 2010). 
Later studies sought a more stringent test of restricted search by making it even less 
plausible that the speaker might know about the contents of occluded squares, and by having 
the privileged competitor visually inaccessible to the listener (Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). In one 
experiment, listeners were presented with a grid containing only shared objects and given a box 
with objects  that  they were supposed to “hide”  from the speaker  in the privileged squares.  In 
this way, there could be little doubt that the speaker was unaware of the contents of the 
occluded spaces. Furthermore, one of these objects (the privileged competitor) was additionally 
to be placed inside of a bag so that it was no longer visible to the listener, such that looking at it 
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could not be interpreted in terms of low level visual interference. The basic findings were 
replicated, with longer gazes on privileged competitors than to noncompetitors, severe delays in 
identifying and selecting the target, and a high error rate (again, around 20%). A second 
experiment went even further by comparing the standard condition in which the speaker was 
presumed to be ignorant of the contents of occluded squares to one in which listeners were led 
to believe that the speaker had a false belief about the contents of the square containing the 
privileged competitor (or noncompetitor); for example, believing that it was a toy truck 
(noncompetitor) when it was actually a small candle. In spite of the fact that this should have 
increased the salience of common ground, there was no evidence that listeners were less 
egocentric in this condition than in the standard ignorance condition. 
These studies, in addition to further studies using the same paradigm (Epley et al., 2004; 
Lin et al., 2010) were presented as evidence against restricted search and in support of an 
anchoring-and-adjustment model of perspective taking known as perspective adjustment. 
According  to  perspective  adjustment,  comprehension  processes  are  initially  “anchored”  in 
information available to the self. Listeners can optionally use common ground to adjust away 
from this anchor point, but this adjustment step is optional, and requires sufficient time and 
processing resources. Thus, comprehension will be egocentrically biased to the extent that 
listeners fail to adjust away from their own perspective. 
While these initial studies provided clear evidence against restricted search, and 
documented an alarming degree of egocentrism in spoken language comprehension, they had a 
number of limitations that subsequent studies sought to address. First, Keysar and colleagues 
provided only minimal time-course information, such as first and final fixation times. These are 
only crude measures of online processing, and may not be as sensitive as analyses that test for 
effects across various time windows. 
A further criticism was that the competitors in privileged ground were always a better 
match to the semantics of the target description than the target itself (Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; 
Hanna et al., 2003); for instance, the privileged small candle was even smaller than the target 
small candle. The original rationale for this feature was that it provided a distinct interpretation 
in privileged ground; otherwise, if the privileged competitor was an equally good fit to the 
description as the target, then listeners would be forced to use common ground to resolve the 
ambiguity. It could be argued, however, that this feature leads to an overestimation of listener 
egocentrism. Nevertheless, even when the target and competitor are equalized for their fit to 
the referring expression, egocentric behavior is still observed: in one such study, the presence of 
a competitor caused 65% of listeners to ask for clarification (which candle?) at least once during 
the experiment, even though there was only one possible referent in common ground (this 
result did not hold for Asian participants; see Wu & Keysar, 2007 and Wu, Barr, Gann, & Keysar, 
2013 for additional discussion). 
A more serious criticism was that these early efforts did not provide definitive support for 
the perspective-adjustment view, because they lacked a critical control (Hanna et al., 2003; 
Nadig & Sedivy, 2002). The analyses always compared a privileged competitor to a privileged 
noncompetitor. While such a comparison is sufficient to test the restricted search hypothesis, it 
is insufficient to support perspective adjustment as an alternative. Perspective adjustment 
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assumes that listeners are “egocentric first”, but Keysar, Barr and colleagues only demonstrated 
that privileged competitors were fixated more that privileged noncompetitors. Showing that 
listeners were initially egocentric would have required demonstrating that privileged 
competitors were fixated just as much as competitors in common ground, but the studies lacked 
this  condition.  Thus,  data  from  these  studies  are  consistent  not  only  with  “egocentric  first” 
models, but also with models which assume that common ground exerts an immediate but 
partial (rather than absolute) effect on referential processing. 
Partial, immediate effects of common ground could be explained by probabilistic 
constraint-based models (PCBMs). The PCBM approach is thoroughly interactive and 
nonmodular, and assumes that the different sources of constraint available to the 
comprehension system, including common ground, is weighted and interactively combined from 
the earliest moments of comprehension (MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994; 
Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, & Hanna, 2000). Importantly, there is assumed to be no limitation 
on the interaction between different levels of processing: information at very high levels of 
processing (such as the systems tracking mutual knowledge) can, in principle, constrain the 
operation of the lowest levels of processing (e.g., phonological processing and lexical access). 
The extent of this constraint depends not on the type of information but only on how heavily it 
is weighted (i.e., its salience and reliability). In this respect, PCBMs are similar in spirit (and often 
functionally equivalent) to Bayesian models, which mathematically specify the optimal 
combination of information in probabilistic reasoning (Jurafsky, 1996). 
PCBMs assume gradient effects of common ground, and thus predict that less competition 
should be observed from a competitor in privileged ground than in common ground. Such 
gradient effects would falsify the “egocentric first” prediction of perspective adjustment. To test 
this, Hanna et al. (2003), varied whether the critical alternative was privileged or shared. In the 
study, pairs were visually separated by a divider, and a (confederate) director instructed a 
listener to place geometric shapes in an array to match the pattern viewed by the director. 
Instead of visual occlusion, common ground was established through a grounding process in 
which the director and participant talked about which shapes they had in common. At some 
point, the director gave a critical instruction describing a target red triangle, in the context of a 
critical alternative that was either a competitor (another red triangle) or noncompetitor (a green 
triangle), and that was either privileged or shared. Consistent with PCBMs, listeners were more 
likely to gaze at a shared target than at a privileged competitor, and this difference was present 
from the earliest moments of comprehension. Similar findings were reported by Nadig and 
Sedivy (2002) in a study involving five- and six- year-old children. Taken together, these findings 
disconfirm the “egocentric first” prediction of the perspective-adjustment view. 
Brown-Schmidt (2009b) found additional evidence for early effects of common ground. 
Listeners  answered  a  speaker’s  questions  about  privileged  objects  (see  also  Brown-Schmidt, 
Gunlogson, & Tanenhaus, 2008). The questions included ambiguous nouns that referenced 
certain shared landmark objects, adjacent to which these privileged objects were located. The 
ambiguous nouns were disambiguated by a following subordinate phrase: for example, listeners 
might hear What’s above the cow that’s wearing shoes?  in a context with two cartoon cows, a 
“target”  landmark  cow wearing  shoes and a  “competitor”  landmark cow wearing glasses.  The 
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question was whether listeners could, prior to the disambiguating word (e.g., shoes), use 
common ground to identify the target landmark and associated privileged target. There were 
two critical manipulations, the first of which, “mention”, was whether the speaker had already 
sought information about the identity of the privileged competitor located adjacent to the 
competitor landmark (e.g., the cow wearing glasses), or had instead asked about a control 
object.  In the former case (the “competitor-mentioned” condition), when speakers  later asked 
“What’s above the cow...” listeners could use common ground to infer that the speaker must be 
asking about the target cow, since she already knew what was above the competitor cow. 
Brown-Schmidt  also  introduced  a  second  manipulation,  “grounding”,  crossed  with  the  first, 
which was whether or not the speaker gave evidence of actually having properly understood the 
listener’s reply.  If  listeners use common ground, they should show the earliest disambiguation 
effect when a competitor was mentioned and successfully grounded, since this is the case where 
the evidence was strongest that the speaker already knew the identity of the privileged item 
that was next to the competitor landmark. 
In her analysis, Brown-Schmidt considered three consecutive 400 ms bins starting from 
the onset of the noun (e.g., cow), the first two of which would capture pre-disambiguation 
effects, and the third of which would capture post-disambiguation effects. The analysis 
suggested that listeners gazed at the target landmark and adjacent privileged target earlier 
when the competitor landmark had been mentioned, and did so prior to the disambiguating 
word. However, this effect only reached significance when the grounding of the privileged 
competitor had been successful, suggesting that listeners used common ground to resolve the 
reference. 
Reconciling the findings 
The above selective review of key studies on perspective taking in spoken language 
comprehension reveals clear progress, but the field is far from reaching agreement on the 
nature or timing of partner-specific effects. The main points of agreement are that (1) 
comprehension is not restricted to common ground, but shows egocentric effects and (2) 
common ground can be accessed early, and not just as part of a post-comprehension stage, as 
suggested by the perspective-adjustment model. These findings can be explained by PCBMs. 
However, although these studies have shown early access to common ground, they have not 
gone further to show that this information was actually integrated with subsequent referential 
processing. 
Visual world studies of information integration seek to understand how contextual 
evidence modulates the uptake of linguistic evidence. Each trial in a visual world study has a 
particular temporal structure whose importance is often overlooked: namely, that the 
presentation of the relevant contextual evidence temporally precedes that of the critical 
linguistic evidence, often by a large interval. For example, in the classic study of effects of visual 
context on syntactic processing by Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, and Sedivy (1995), 
listeners had visual access to the information in the scene for some substantial amount of time 
prior to hearing the critical, syntactically ambiguous portion of the expression. Or, in perspective 
taking studies, listeners are given evidence about which referents are shared and which are 
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privileged long before they hear a speaker make reference to any target object. Of course, such 
a time lag is necessary, given that it is only possible to test whether people make use of 
potentially constraining contextual information if they are given sufficient time to attend to and 
process that information. However, prior availability of context can also produce differences in 
gaze probabilities before the onset of the referring expression, and such anticipatory baseline 
effects (ABEs) can cloud the interpretation of effects present during the acoustic lifetime of the 
referring expression (Barr, 2008a, 2008b; Barr, Gann, & Pierce, 2010). 
ABEs are especially likely to arise in studies of perspective taking, since the critical 
contextual information about what is or is not in common ground (or who is going to speak next) 
is nearly always available from the onset of the trial. In one of the first experiments, Keysar et al. 
(2000) noted that in a five second window prior to speech onset, listeners were more likely to 
gaze at shared than at privileged referents. Such a “head start” for the probability of gazing at 
shared objects may persist into the critical referring expression itself. What is important about 
this is that it reflects information that listeners access in anticipation of upcoming speech. At the 
person level, observing that listeners are more likely to gaze at objects consistent with context 
could be taken as evidence they are making predictions about what the speaker might refer to 
next. In this sense, it supports the idea of early sensitivity to common ground—but only at the 
person level. 
Pitching explanations at the process level rather than at the person level opens up the 
possibility of dissociations—some levels of processing may have access to information that is not 
accessible at other levels (Fodor, 1983; Sloman, 1996). Indeed, the presence of dissociations 
between access and integration can be quite informative about underlying cognitive and 
neurological architecture. Such access-integration dissociations are often seen in vision, for 
example; knowing that the two lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion are actually of equal length (e.g., 
by measuring them using a ruler) does not keep us from experiencing them as if they are 
different; although the equality is represented in our minds, our visual system behaves as 
though it lacks access to it, a phenomenon known as cognitive impenetrability (Fodor, 1983). To 
show that information was integrated at a particular level of processing, it is insufficient to show 
that it was attended to at the person level. 
To test claims about whether contextual information is integrated into linguistic 
processing at a particular level, it is necessary to statistically or experimental isolate effects at 
that level in order to assess whether they are modulated by contextual information (Barr, 
2008b). Showing that listeners are more likely to look at shared competitors than at privileged 
competitors—as shown by Hanna et al. (2003) and Nadig and Sedivy (2002), among others—
indicates that common ground was used, but  it doesn’t  tell you how it was used. It is entirely 
possible that listeners used common ground to anticipate what the speaker would refer to next, 
but were unable to integrate that information during certain levels of referential processing. To 
the extent that gazes to common ground objects are no higher during referential processing as 
before that processing began casts doubt on the idea that common ground is actually being 
used in the processing of the expression. 
To test these ideas, Barr (2008b) conducted three perspective-taking experiments using a 
design similar to Hanna, Trueswell, and Tanenhaus, but examining temporary lexical ambiguities 
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(buckle-bucket) rather than full lexical ambiguities. Because the ambiguity is temporary, 
listeners can ultimately resolve the ambiguity based on the phonology itself. Therefore, finding 
evidence that common ground modulates the processing of the initial portion of the word in this 
case would be strong evidence that it is accessed and used spontaneously during spoken 
language comprehension. Listeners viewed computerized displays containing four objects and 
heard a speaker (presumed to be speaking from another room and looking at a different 
computer screen) instruct them to Click on the [target object]. In addition to the target object 
(e.g., bucket), two of the remaining objects on the screen were also in common ground with the 
speaker. The fourth, final object in each test display was a critical alternative that was either a 
competitor (e.g., buckle) or noncompetitor (e.g., stepladder) and was furthermore either 
privileged (i.e., the listener believed that the speaker saw a blank box where the listener saw the 
critical alternative) or shared (i.e., the listener believed that the speaker also could see the 
object). 
The analysis was time-aligned to the onset of the noun identifying the target object (e.g. 
“bucket”). To the extent that listeners attend to common ground prior to the onset of the noun, 
during this same interval they should show a tendency to gaze at the critical alternative more 
when it is shared than when it is privileged. If listeners are able to further integrate this 
information into language processing, then the effect of lexical competition (e.g., whether the 
critical alternative is a buckle or a stepladder) should matter more when the critical alternative is 
in common ground than when it is privileged. In other words, the competition effect (the greater 
tendency to gaze at the buckle than the stepladder) should be larger when the critical 
alternative is in common ground, a pattern we will call anticipation plus integration. In contrast, 
if lexical processes are encapsulated from this higher level information, then the competition 
effect should appear no different in the two conditions, a pattern we will call anticipation 
without integration. 
 
Figure 1. Predicted gaze behavior (left panel) and lexical competition effects (right panel) from 
an “ideal listener” model under different levels of contextual constraint. 
What is the basis for the claim that integration of common ground should lead to 
attenuation of the lexical competition effect? To sharpen intuitions, let us consider language 
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processing from the point of view of an ideal listener who optimally integrates prior 
expectations with  incoming  linguistic  information. Using Bayes’ theorem, we can formalize our 
intuitions about how prior expectations might modulate the lexical competition effect. Note that 
lexical competition is defined here as the difference in probability of gazing at the critical 
alternative when it is a lexical competitor (e.g., buckle) versus a noncompetitor (e.g., stepladder) 
when processing the target word (e.g., bucket). Figure 1 presents hypothetical data for a fixed 
evidence function under three different levels of prior expectations (.40, .25, and .10). All of the 
functions were derived by applying Bayes’ theorem to the same evidence under different priors. 
When the listener believes that the critical alternative is a highly plausible referent—for 
instance, with a prior probability of .40—there is a large competition effect (right panel). As the 
critical alternative becomes less plausible, the competition effect becomes smaller; compare the 
effects for .10 and .40 in the right panel. This is a consequence of the evidence function being 
multiplied by different priors, as Bayes’ Theorem stipulates.  (Note that for the purpose of this 
article, we are dealing with claims about the size of the competition effect on the proportional 
scale, not the log odds scale.) 
 
 
Figure 2. Overall results from Barr (2008), Experiment 1 (B08-1); Hanna, Tanenhaus, & Trueswell 
(2003), Experiment 1 (HT&T03-1), and Brown-Schmidt (2009) (BS09). Panel (a) shows the results 
broken down by condition; panel (b) shows the competition effect by common ground status. 
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In Barr’s first experiment (Figure 2, top panel) common ground had a strong, statistically reliable 
effect  on  listeners’  prior  expectation  about what  the  speaker would  refer  to.  Listeners  gazed 
more at the critical alternative when it was in common ground with the listener than when it 
was privileged (with prior probabilities of approximately .20 versus .05, respectively, from 0–200 
ms after speech onset, which is before language driven effects can appear assuming a 200 ms 
overhead for saccadic programming). But despite a strong difference in prior expectation, there 
was little evidence for any attenuation whatsoever of the competition effect in the privileged 
condition (top row, right panel of the figure). This result, which suggests that lexical processes 
are cognitively impenetrable with respect to common ground, was replicated in two additional 
experiments. 
The  second  experiment  contrasted  listeners’  ability  to  integrate  common  ground  with 
their ability to integrate information from a preceding verb. Based on previous results from 
Dahan and Tanenhaus (2004), it was expected that the verb-based constraint would induce an 
anticipation-plus-integration pattern, reflecting the penetrability of lexical processes to prior 
linguistic context, while the constraint from common ground would yield an anticipation-
without-integration pattern, suggesting cognitive impenetrability. One group of participants 
were in the common ground condition, and completed an experiment identical to Experiment 1. 
For a second group, the common ground manipulation was replaced with manipulation of the 
verb preceding the critical noun. Half of the utterances given to this latter group began with the 
verb click (e.g., “click on the bucket”), which  is unconstraining  inasmuch as  it could potentially 
apply to any picture in the display. This unconstraining-verb condition played a role analogous to 
the shared condition for the common ground group (in fact, it was identical to that condition). In 
the other half of the sentences presented to this second group, the verb click was replaced by a 
constraining verb that accepted the target as a potential direct object, but not the critical 
alternative. For example, the verb empty in empty the bucket could apply only to the bucket, but 
not to the stepladder or buckle. This constraining-verb condition plays a role analogous to the 
privileged ground condition in Experiment 1, because as in that condition, well before the onset 
of the noun, the contextual information already favors the target over the critical alternative. 
Figure 3. Effects of verb constraint on lexical competition, Experiment 2 of Barr (2008). 
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The listeners in the common ground condition showed the same anticipation-without-
integration pattern seen in the first experiment. In contrast, listeners in the verb-based 
constraint group showed a very different pattern. Like the common ground group, the prior 
contextual constraint exerted a strong effect on the prior likelihood of gazing at the critical 
alternative. When the verb was one for which the critical alternative would be implausible as a 
direct object (e.g., the verb empty in relation to a buckle or a stepladder), listeners had a much 
lower prior expectation that the critical alternative would be mentioned (about .05 versus .15 in 
the condition where the verb was not constraining; see Figure 3, left panel). This immediate 
constraining effect of verbs is similar to that observed in Altmann & Kamide, 1999 and Dahan & 
Tanenhaus, 2004. The fact that this strong anticipatory effect was present suggests that the verb 
had been processed in time to influence the processing of the following referential expression. 
But unlike for the common ground condition, there was strong evidence for attenuated lexical 
competition in the condition with the lower prior (Figure 3, right panel). In other words, in line 
with the ideal listener model, whether or not the critical alternative was a competitor mattered 
less when the critical alternative was an implausible object of the verb. 
The anticipatory effects of common ground, which were seen across three independent 
experiments, supports the claims of Hanna et al. (2003) and Nadig and Sedivy (2002) that 
listeners are sensitive to common ground from the earliest moments of processing, and thus 
also reject the “egocentric first” account put forward by Keysar, Barr and colleagues. However, 
looking at the data from a process level suggests that the egocentrism that is observed across all 
of these studies may not reflect partial use of common ground, but may be the result of the 
failure to integrate common ground into lexical processing, despite a strong prior expectation. 
This might imply that lexical processes are encapsulated from common ground information, and 
perhaps other kinds of situational information as well. The results from the verb-constraint 
condition provide an important contrast, inasmuch as they show that lexical processes are not 
fully encapsulated from all contextual information. Indeed, verb semantics have very strongly 
constraining effects on processing. It is an important question for future research to characterize 
the source of differences between these two types of contextual constraint. 
Advocates of PCBMs have argued against these findings on both theoretical and statistical 
grounds. On the theoretical side, Brown-Schmidt and Hanna (2011) cite the lack of interactivity 
in Barr’s experiments. To be sure, although listeners were actually hearing recorded materials, 
two of three of the experiments employed elaborate cover stories to convince listeners that 
they were listening to speakers who spoke to them live from another room. However, Brown-
Schmidt and Hanna (2011) believe this is insufficient for establishing common ground: 
...according to classic accounts, common ground forms as individuals collaboratively 
establish what information is jointly known through an interactive grounding 
process (Brennan & Clark, 1996). In each of the studies that have shown significant 
effects of common ground in on-line interpretation, participants interacted with live 
partners with whom they were able to collaboratively form common ground (e.g., 
Hanna, et al., 2003; Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; Heller, et al., 2008; Brown-Schmidt, et al., 
2008; Brown-Schmidt,  2009a,b;  Metzing  &  Brennan,  2003).  In  contrast,  in  Barr’s 
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(2008) experiments, participants never interacted with live partners, and never 
engaged in grounding procedures.” (p. 22). 
Note that some of the interactive experiments cited by Brown-Schmidt and Hanna created 
opportunities for grounding, but did not require it as part of the procedure (Nadig & Sedivy, 
2002; Heller et al., 2008), and it seems unlikely that referents were actually grounded in every 
case. This also ignores the fact that grounding is a procedure for dealing with cases where 
common ground is uncertain,  and  Barr’s  experiments used procedures where the common 
ground was made  clear  through  the  structure of  the  “game” participants were playing. When 
common ground is not uncertain, it is unnecessary (and in fact, odd) to first engage in grounding 
(e.g., akin to asking someone sitting at your dinner table, “Do you see the salt?” prior to asking 
them to pass it to you.) 
It  is  also  important  to  note  that  listeners  in  Barr’s  experiments  clearly  attended to 
common ground: indeed, the odds of gazing at common ground referents before the onset of 
the expression were three to four times higher than the odds of gazing at privileged ground 
referents. Because the interactional affordances account assumes that grounding is necessary to 
form common ground, it could best account for Barr’s  results  if  there  were  null effects of 
common ground altogether, but it is not clear how it would explain why effects of common 
ground were very large for some processes (referential anticipation) but negligible for others 
(lexical competition). 
The second  criticism  leveled  against  Barr’s  results  is  statistical  in  nature,  and  calls  in 
question the use of regression to partial out effects of common ground on anticipation versus 
integration. This criticism first appeared in a conference presentation by Tanenhaus and 
colleagues (Tanenhaus, Frank, Jaeger, Masharov, & Salverda, 2008) and was further discussed by 
Brown-Schmidt and Hanna (2011) in a footnote. The approach in Barr (2008a) was to 
parameterize a polynomial regression model so that baseline effects were captured in the 
intercept term, with the time-varying (e.g., slope) parameters capturing integration effects. 
Tanenhaus and colleagues acknowledged that anticipatory baseline effects pose a threat to 
interpretation, but suggested that Barr’s approach may introduce statistical artifacts. They note 
that the gaze-state a listener is in at the onset of the referring expression constrains possibilities 
for subsequent gaze states, with a particular concern about cases where at the start of the 
referring expression, listeners are already looking at the referential alternative being analyzed. It 
is difficult to go into detail about the nature of these arguments as they have not been 
adequately expounded in the literature, with only a one page conference abstract publically 
available. Given the scanty information, it is not clear at all whether gaze-state dependencies are 
claimed to exist as an analytical fact or as an empirical possibility. A passing remark in Brown-
Schmidt (2009b) suggests that she considers it an analytical fact having to do with the nature of 
eye data, particularly due to the fact that “...one cannot make a saccade to what one is already 
looking at” (p. 896). The relevance of this tautological observation  is unclear since the primary 
events being analyzed are eye gazes, which extend over time, not discrete saccadic events. It is 
indeed possible to continue or discontinue gazing at what one is already gazing at (see Barr, 
Gann, & Pierce, 2011 for further discussion). Such “in principle” analytical concerns about gaze-
state dependences seem ill-founded. Still, it is also reasonable to view gaze-state dependencies 
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as an empirical possibility, in which the sequences of gazes leading up to the referring 
expression somehow influences how the referential expression itself is processed. Frank, 
Salverda, Jaeger, and Tanenhaus (2009) reported evidence for such dependencies, but their 
results may have been artifacts due to regression toward the mean; ruling out this possiblity 
would require a fuller evaluation of their methods than is possible from a single conference 
poster presentation. In short, it is premature to dismiss the statistical solution proposed by Barr 
(2008a) until: (1) convincing empirical or theoretical arguments in favor of the gaze state 
dependencies have been made in the scientific literature; (2) the logic of how such 
dependencies might bias the proposed statistical solution is clearly articulated and validated; 
and (3) the magnitude of any claimed biases have been measured and compared to the 
potential biases of any alternative solutions. At the time of writing, none of these conditions has 
been met. 
One thing that has been ignored in the debate over baseline effects is the fact that it is 
not necessary to control for baseline effects statistically; indeed, they can be controlled 
experimentally by using appropriate control conditions. Indeed, such experimental control was 
already built into the design of Barr (2008b). The analysis did not directly compare gaze on a 
shared buckle to gaze on a privileged buckle, but instead compared the effect of competition 
(competitor vs. noncompetitor) within the privileged condition (privileged buckle versus 
privileged stepladder) to competition within the shared condition (shared buckle versus shared 
stepladder). Note that within the privileged condition, there is no baseline effect: the privileged 
noncompetitor starts off at the same probability as the privileged competitor. By the same logic, 
there is no baseline difference between the shared competitor and shared noncompetitor. 
Furthermore, it cannot be argued that because the shared competitor starts higher than the 
privileged competitor, it has less room to go up, artificially dampening the competition effect for 
shared referents.1 This apparent “disadvantage” for the shared competitor is perfectly offset by 
the  “advantage”  that  the  shared  noncompetitor  has more room to go down (thus potentially 
enhancing the competition effect) than the privileged noncompetitor. 
The top right panel of Figure 2 (labeled B08-1b) compares these competition effects 
(competitor minus noncompetitor for each of the shared and privileged conditions), controlling 
for anticipatory baseline differences. This analysis very clearly shows no evidence whatsoever 
for a larger competition effect in the common ground condition (if anything, the effect appears 
larger in the privileged condition). Given that this evidence exploits experimental rather than 
statistical control, arguments about “gaze-state dependencies” do not apply. 
Finally, the invocation of interactive grounding as an explanation for the different findings 
is questionable because there may be no differences there to explain in the first place, given 
that not all available studies distinguish access from integration. Still, it is possible to 
qualitatively assess whether the findings are concordant by considering probability data 
                                                          
1 Barr et al. (2011) evaluated the logic of this argument about conditions with higher baselines having less room to 
go up and found it lacking. They showed that regardless of whether trials are on- or off-region at the onset of 
referring expression, they have equal potential, in principle, to increase or decrease subsequent target probabilities. 
Off-region trials vote in favor of the target by becoming on region, and against it by staying off; on-region trials vote in 
favor of the target by staying on region, and against it by becoming off. 
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presented in the figures of Hanna et al. (2003) and Brown-Schmidt (2009b). The probability data 
was extracted and reconstructed from the figures in these papers by a pixel mapping technique 
using photo editing software (GIMP). 
Hanna et al. (2003) used an identical 2x2 factorial design to Barr (2008b), in which 
competition (competitor vs. noncompetitor) was crossed with common ground status 
(privileged vs. shared). Although this design allows for the experimental control of anticipatory 
effects, the authors’ analyses did not take advantage of this control. Instead, inferential statistics 
were presented for data from just one cell of the design, where the critical alternative was a 
privileged competitor. This analysis directly compared probability of gazing at the target (which 
was in common ground) to the probability of gazing at the privileged competitor in this same 
condition, over a 200-800 ms window. However, the advantage they found for the shared target 
could be explained entirely as the result of anticipatory baseline effect favoring the target. If we 
consider data from the full design, would we see a smaller competition effect in the privileged 
ground condition, as the ideal listener model predicts? And if so, at what point would the effect 
appear? 
Gaze probabilities to the critical alternative from Experiment 1 of Hanna et al. (2003) were 
extracted from Figures 2 and 3 of their manuscript, and are given in the middle row of Figure 2 
of  the  current manuscript.  Analyzing  the  data  in  the  same manner  as  we  just  did  for  Barr’s 
experiment, we find an anticipation-without-integration pattern (middle row, right panel). 
Clearly, there is an overall competition effect starting at around 250-300 ms, as evident in the 
rise of the lines from zero in both the shared and privileged condition. However, the competition 
effect in the privileged condition seems identical to the shared condition until around 600 ms at 
which it begins to diverge. There is a simple reason why this divergence appears in Hanna et al. 
but not  in Barr’s experiments: Barr used  lexical ambiguities  that were quickly  resolved by  the 
input (buckle-bucket), whereas Hanna et al. used full ambiguities (e.g., both target and 
competitor were identical red triangles). Because the input never resolved the ambiguity, 
listeners in the shared competitor condition would have to ask the speaker which referent she 
intended; thus, the competition effect in this condition is long lasting. In contrast, in the 
privileged competitor condition, listeners could spontaneously resolve the ambiguity by making 
use of the information that the speaker was unaware of the privileged red triangle. The fact that 
they did this late—well after the onset of the competition effect—suggests that the effect could 
be postlexical, and is thus consistent with the evidence presented in Barr (2008b) for the 
encapsulation of lexical processing from common ground. 
A similar approach can be applied to results from Brown-Schmidt (2009b). Following the 
approach described by Tanenhaus et al. (2008), Brown-Schmidt (2009b) removed all trials 
starting with a gaze to either the target or competitor regions (nearly 40% of all data). However, 
Barr et al. (2011) showed that not only is such drastic data removal unnecessary, it actually 
introduces bias due to regression toward the mean (and potentially selection biases as well). 
Therefore, we consider the results for the full data that Brown-Schmidt presented in the 
appendix (Figure A1 of Brown-Schmidt, 2009b). Unlike the previous analyses, which looked at 
competition  effects,  here we  look  at  the  effect  of  “mention”,  that  is,  of  whether  or  not  the 
listener had already attempted to give the speaker information about the identity of the 
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privileged  item  adjacent  to  the  competitor  landmark.  Note  that  it  is  only  in  the  “grounded” 
condition that listeners should consider this information part of common ground, because it is 
only in this condition that listeners had evidence that speakers actually registered the 
information. 
The raw data are plotted in the left panel of the bottom row of Figure 2, with the effect of 
mention plotted in the right panel of the same row. One notable result is that even before 
listeners processed the target word (e.g., cow), there was already a quite substantial effect of 
mention present in both the grounded and ungrounded condition. In fact, at 0 ms (the onset of 
the word) the effect of mention already looks slightly larger in the grounded condition than in 
the ungrounded condition. Thus, even before listener knew that the speaker would refer to the 
cow, they were already paying attention to information in common ground. This apparent 
anticipatory baseline effect is entirely consistent with that observed in Barr’s experiments. Note 
additionally that the difference between the effects of mention for the grounded and 
ungrounded conditions only really begins to exceed this baseline effect 600-800 ms after word 
onset; the lines seem to rise roughly in parallel up to this point. This overall pattern—an 
apparent anticipatory effect of common ground, followed by apparent-partner independent 
processing, followed again by a late effect of common ground—is consistent with encapsulated 
language processing during the ambiguous noun. 
Different interpretations of the same underlying data pattern 
In summary, literature reviews of visual world studies on perspective taking have largely 
taken the diverging findings of the various studies at face value, and some have attributed these 
apparently different findings to differences in the extent to which the paradigms used by 
different labs afford collaborative interaction (Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Brown-Schmidt & 
Hanna, 2011; see also Brown-Schmidt, this volume). Such authors suggest that those studies in 
which common ground is established interactively are also those that show the strongest effects 
of common ground. But this explanation seems implausible, for two reasons. First, it leaves 
unexplained why some noncollaborative studies show strong effects of common ground on 
certain aspects of processing (i.e., anticipatory baseline effects) but not on others (i.e., 
competition effects). Second, and more importantly, they make the mistake of assuming that 
the divergent findings are real. However, when anticipatory effects of common ground are 
controlled for, these studies show roughly the same evidence in favor of the encapsulation of 
lexical processes from common ground, regardless of the collaborative potential afforded by the 
paradigm. 
This analysis reveals that the failure to appropriately distinguish access from integration 
has led to the overestimation of listeners’ abilities to integrate common ground with incoming 
input. Whereas listeners seem to be able to integrate semantic information from a preceding 
verb to a near optimal level, this does not seem to be the case for common ground. The results 
generally suggest that there is a period early in the processing of referential expressions that 
proceeds entirely autonomously from common ground, and possibly from other kinds of 
situational information. But given the controversial nature of this claim, it is important to pursue 
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further studies corroborating the basic finding, as well as attempting to delimit the types of 
contextual information that cannot be integrated. 
The study of perspective taking in language processing is challenging on many levels. 
Researchers often adopt conflicting definitions of what counts as perspective taking or common 
ground, sometime conflating notions of mutual belief with shared information or information 
that is merely associated with a speaker (see Keysar, 1997 and Lee, 2001 for discussion). 
Theoretical disputes arise out of a failure to distinguish the use of speaker associated 
information from the use of meta-representational  information  about  a  speaker’s  beliefs.  For 
instance, an ERP study has shown that stereotypical information associated with a particular 
type of speaker influences lexical processing (van Berkum, van den Brink, Tesink, Kos, & Hagoort, 
2008); e.g., listeners experience a classic N400 effect to the contextually inappropriate word 
“tattoo” when hearing the sentence “I have a large tattoo on my back” spoken in an upper-class 
accent. But stereotypical information about a type of speaker is not the same as information 
about a particular speaker’s beliefs and goals; the former type of information is representational 
and contextually stable; the latter is meta-representational and can be highly contextually 
variable. Additionally, studying perspective taking or “mentalizing” more generally is challenging 
because many things that look like genuine mentalizing can be produced by simpler mechanisms 
that do not  involve representations of another’s beliefs  (for discussion, see Barr, 2014; Heyes, 
2014). It is also a problem that interlocutor behavior in highly interactive contexts is mutually 
dependent (by definition), which makes it difficult to distinguish behaviors that reflect mutual 
adjustments arising from feedback from truly individual cognitive adaptations undertaken 
unilaterally and spontaneously (Barr, 2014). 
Finally, as noted in this review, research on perspective taking is challenging because of 
the often complex nature of the relationship between data and theory, which arises from the 
rich nature of visual-world eyetracking data. Despite this complexity, the fact that researchers 
are asking increasingly sophisticated and nuanced questions about perspective taking is an 
encouraging sign of progress. However, to progress further, the field needs to forge consensus 
on basic issues of data analysis and interpretation. The approaches that researchers adopt to 
data analysis in visual-world perspective-taking studies are currently far too eclectic, 
unprincipled, and ad hoc. Unfortunately, this is probably also true of visual world research in 
general. Statistical and experimental solutions have already been proposed in the peer-reviewed 
literature (Barr, 2008a,b; Barr et al., 2011), but researchers often ignore these solutions without 
adequate justification based on the suspicion that they are unsound. However, this suspicion 
currently lacks a clear theoretical or empirical justification. Citing vague concerns about possible 
“gaze state dependencies” should not give researchers carte blanche to ignore the interpretive 
problems imposed by anticipatory baseline effects, nor to dismiss the solutions to these 
problems that have already been proposed and evaluated. Resolving this debate should be 
prioritized, as a basic consensus on analysis and interpretation is preliminary to any broader 
theoretical debates about interactivity and language processing. Research in this area still has 
great potential to enhance our understanding of language processing in real-world settings, but 
can only do if it rests on a solid foundation of data analysis and interpretation. 
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